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[2307.09478] The Role of Transparency in Repeated First-Price Auctions with Unkn...
source link: https://arxiv.org/abs/2307.09478
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Computer Science > Computer Science and Game Theory
[Submitted on 14 Jul 2023 (v1), last revised 21 Mar 2024 (this version, v2)]
The Role of Transparency in Repeated First-Price Auctions with Unknown Valuations
We study the problem of regret minimization for a single bidder in a sequence of first-price auctions where the bidder discovers the item's value only if the auction is won. Our main contribution is a complete characterization, up to logarithmic factors, of the minimax regret in terms of the auction's \emph{transparency}, which controls the amount of information on competing bids disclosed by the auctioneer at the end of each auction. Our results hold under different assumptions (stochastic, adversarial, and their smoothed variants) on the environment generating the bidder's valuations and competing bids. These minimax rates reveal how the interplay between transparency and the nature of the environment affects how fast one can learn to bid optimally in first-price auctions.
| Comments: | Accepted at STOC 2024 |
| Subjects: | Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT); Data Structures and Algorithms (cs.DS); Machine Learning (cs.LG) |
| Cite as: | arXiv:2307.09478 [cs.GT] |
| (or arXiv:2307.09478v2 [cs.GT] for this version) | |
| https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2307.09478 |
Submission history
From: Federico Fusco [view email][v1] Fri, 14 Jul 2023 09:16:24 UTC (43 KB)
[v2] Thu, 21 Mar 2024 10:28:38 UTC (130 KB)
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