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The danger of the SQL Editor of DBACOCKPIT

 1 year ago
source link: https://blogs.sap.com/2022/05/10/the-danger-of-the-sql-editor-of-dbacockpit/
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The DBACOCKPIT of SAP NetWeaver AS ABAP and ABAP Platform provides the SQL Editor which can be used to execute SQL statements on connected databases.

The SQL Editor is a full featured SQL command line and supports all SQL statements as listed, for example, in the SAP HANA SQL Reference Guide for SAP HANA Platform. It was designed to cover the exact scope as the SQL Editor of HANA Studio.

SQL%20Editor%20of%20DBACOCKPIT

SQL Editor of DBACOCKPIT

Updates:

The danger

Since the SQL statements are executed on DB level as the connecting user, the privileges of this particular user are applied. For the ABAP system’s primary database, it is the schema user SAPDAT, SAP<SID>, or SAPABAP<n>.

With this the SQL Editor can be used, for example, to access all tables of the ABAP schema.

Please also note that on database level, there is no special handling of the client filed (field ‘MANDT’). This leads to, even if the SQL Editor is started in client 000, data of other clients can be accessed or modified.

Hint: This should be considered especially in scenarios where client 000 is managed by service providers, since this might open a door for accessing data in productive clients.

Access to the SQL Editor

Access to the SQL Editor is protected by the following authorization objects.

S_TCODE for the entry point to DBACOCKPIT. As there are several tcodes allowing to enter DBACOCKPIT and switching to the SQL Editor, you can find a summary below (without guarantee of being complete).

S_ADMI_FCD, S_RZL_ADM and S_DBCON which are required to start the DBACOCKPIT and to enter the SQL Editor.

Overview of involved authorization objects:

Object Attribute Value Operator
S_TCODE TCD DB01, DB02, DB03, DB12, DB12OLD, DB13, DB13C, DB20, DB26, DB2C, DB50, DB6CLP, DB6EXPLAIN, DB6PLAN, DBACOCKPIT, DBACOCKPIT_NWA, DBACOCKPIT_SOLMAN, ST04 or
S_ADMI_FCD S_ADMI_FCD ST0R
S_RZL_ADM ACTVT 01, 03 or
S_DBCON ACTVT *
S_DBCON DBA_DBHOST <dbhostname>
S_DBCON DBA_DBSID <dbsid>
S_DBCON DBA_DBUSER <dbuser>

Authorizations for working with SQL Editor

There are two authorization objects controlling what a user can actually do with the SQL Editor:

S_DBCON and S_TABU_SQL

Object Attribute Value
S_DBCON ACTVT 01, 03, 36
S_TABU_SQL ACTVT 33
TABLE <tablename>
DBSID <dbname>, LOCL

Differentiate between use cases

As of the documentation

At time of writing the documentation differentiates three use cases:

  1. read data
  2. read and modify database configuration
  3. do everything – no restriction

To map these use cases, a combination of S_DBCON and S_TABU_SQL is utilized.

Details about the combinations are outlined in https://help.sap.com/viewer/6b8fe8492ce14d24af5855c3d10701e3/202110.001/en-US/d4716e2d3f304b238463499cb3117b33.html.

In reality

As of my research, in reality there are four use cases:

  1. read data
  2. do everything – no restriction
  3. modify database configuration
  4. modify everything – no read

While for 1. and 2. S_TABU_SQL must be additionally assigned to the user, for 3. and especially 4. this is not the case.

The description in the documentation does not make this clear. At time of writing there is stated:

The SQL editor is enabled for all types of SQL statements.

You need to grant authorization for each individual table to be accessed. To specify tables and views to be accessed, use the authorization object S_TABU_SQL.

As of my observations this should read as

The SQL editor is enabled for all types of SQL statements, except SELECT statements.

For SELECT, you need to grant authorization for each individual table to be accessed. To specify tables and views to be accessed, use the authorization object S_TABU_SQL.

In fact, S_TABU_SQL is not needed for INSERT, UPDATE, UPSERT, DELETE, ALTER, and all other manipulative SQL statements.

To run manipulative SQL statements, the user needs in total the following privileges in the ABAP system:

Object Attribute Value Operator
S_TCODE TCD

DB01,DB02,DB03,DB12,DB12OLD,DB13,DB13C,DB20,DB26,DB2C,DB50,DB6CLP,

DB6EXPLAIN,DB6PLAN,DBACOCKPIT,DBACOCKPIT_NWA,DBACOCKPIT_SOLMAN,ST04

or
S_ADMI_FCD S_ADMI_FCD ST0R
S_DBCON ACTVT 36
S_DBCON DBA_DBHOST <hostname>
S_DBCON DBA_DBSID <DBSID>
S_DBCON DBA_DBUSER <DBACOCKPITuser>
S_RZL_ADM ACTVT 01, 03 or

No involvement of S_TABU_SQL here!

Audit Logging

For each SQL statement, except SELECT, an entry is written in the Audit Log of DBACOCKPIT. All logs for any commands executed in the SQL Editor are logged as ‘Data manipulation’ in column Object.

Audit%20Log%20of%20DBACOCKPIT

Audit Log of DBACOCKPIT

Technically the audit logs are stored in the tables DB6AUDITDT and DB6AUDITHD.

By default, the audit logs are deleted after 90 days. The retention period can be adjusted by adjusting the field retain = <number of retention days> of table DB6PM_CLN where the field sysid = ‘<sapsid>’ and objecttype = ‘U’ and stattype = ‘D’.

Hint: To make the table DB6PM_CLN maintainable, please implement SAP note 3186701 including the manual tasks, which was created upon my request.

The clean-up is by default performed once a week by the report RSDB_WDB. It is scheduled by TCOLL (ST03 -> Collector and Performance DB -> Performance Monitor Collector -> Execution Times).

Further mitigation

SAP introduced a BAdi to implement further, sophisticated logics to control the behavior of SQL Editor. Details can be found in SAP note 2618043.

This BAdi allows, for example, also an implementation to enable logging of  SELECT statements. This might be relevant in systems which already utilize the Read Access Log (RAL) to log who accessed what data and when.

Conclusion

The authorization object S_DBCON=36 is very powerful and should not be granted on a routine basis. It allows to harm the data’s integrity and availability.

Hint: SAP agreed to add a check for S_DBCON=36 to the Security Check in SAP EarlyWatch Alert.

The authorization object S_DBCON in combination with S_TABU_SQL is also very powerful and should not be granted on a routine basis.” It allows to harm the data’s confidentiality.

Credits and big thanks to Adrian, who did an awesome job walking with me trough all the construction refinements and helped in revealing technical details.


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